The Three Levels of Law’s Goodness and then One More: Exploring John Finnis’s Account of Good Juridical Reasons for Action by Popovic, P. (Petar)
PERSONA Y DERECHO / VOL. 83 / 2020/2 / [521-552] 521
ISSN 0211-4526 • DOI 10.15581/011.83.007
The Three Levels of Law’s Goodness and then 
One More: Exploring John Finnis’s Account of 
Good Juridical Reasons for Action
Los tres niveles de la bondad de la Ley y uno más: explorando la teoría 
de las buenas razones jurídicas para la acción de John Finnis
Petar PoPoVić
Faculty of Canon Law
Pontifical University of the Holy Cross
p.popovic@pusc.it
http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5282-0850
RECIBIDO: 01/06/2020 / ACEPTADO: 12/12/2020
Summary: The article revisits, in the first section, the core 
arguments of John Finnis’s account of law’s «goodness». 
Having established that the premises of these arguments 
are situated in Finnis’s theses on what constitutes good 
juridical reasons for action, and on law’s «double life», 
the three levels of law’s goodness are explored in detail. 
In the second section, the author argues that Aquinas’s 
juridical philosophy contains another discrete level of ju-
ridical goodness relevant to law. This level is then presen-
ted along with a critical assessment of its harmony with 
Finnis’s theory.
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Resumen: El artículo revisa, en la primera sección, los 
argumentos centrales del relato de John Finnis sobre la 
«bondad» de la ley. Una vez establecido que las premisas 
de estos argumentos están situadas en las tesis de Finnis 
sobre lo que constituyen buenas razones jurídicas para la 
acción, y sobre la «doble vida» de la ley, se exploran en 
detalle los tres niveles de bondad de esta. En la segunda 
sección, el autor argumenta que la filosofía jurídica de 
Tomás de Aquino contiene otro nivel discreto de bondad 
jurídica relevante para la ley. El análisis de este nivel se pre-
senta junto con una evaluación crítica de su armonía con 
la teoría de Finnis.
Palabras clave: John Finnis, razones para la acción, bon-
dad de la ley, bienes humanos básicos, razonabilidad prác-
tica, justicia.
i. intRoDuCtion
I t is not easy to envision a more foundational question in the field of legal philosophy than the one regarding the overlap between the «law» and the «good», both on a conceptual and on an ontological level. It is often over-
looked that this question includes two inter-connected layers of analysis. First, 
we may ask whether some element of the good should be necessarily included 
in the concept or in the very nature of law; this is otherwise known as the «ne-
cessary connection between law and morality» question. Then again, we can 
also ask whether and under what conditions the good, both conceptually and 
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ontologically, may also be said to possess an inherently juridical status. One 
may speak of the law in terms of its «goodness» in many different ways, but in 
legal philosophy such discourse is never demoted to the status of merely figu-
rative speech. Rather, it represents a sort of indicator that determines the exact 
coordinates of the author’s position on the conceptual and argumentative map 
of the intersection between the «law» and the «good».
Since the publication of his work Natural Law and Natural Rights 
(«NLNR») forty years ago, John Finnis has become known as arguably the 
most prominent advocate for the positive answer to both aspects of the ques-
tion regarding the «goodness» of law. His positive answer to this question is, 
as we will see, carefully outlined across multiple levels, each level correspond-
ing to a discrete aspect of the good as the peculiar standpoint from which the 
law may be analysed. In this article I will explore various levels of law’s good-
ness as this is outlined in Finnis’s writings, from NLNT to the present day.
In a relatively recent interview, Finnis has offered a definition of what 
he calls his «new classical natural law theory»: «I think of it as an explana-
tion of the sense of having law, why we have law and what it’s for and how 
all that ‘why’ and that ‘what for’ enter into the very content of the law, or 
should» 1. Finnis’s theoretical project may be understood as an account of how 
the «why» and the «what for» that «enter into the very content of law» inter-
sect with various but precisely determined aspects of the concept of the good. 
As he himself has said in the very first paragraph of NLNR:
«There are human goods that can be secured only through the institu-
tions of human law, and requirements of practical reasonableness that only 
those institutions can satisfy. It is the object of this book to identify those 
goods, and those requirements of practical reasonableness, and thus to show 
how and on what conditions such institutions are justified and the ways in 
which they can be (and often are) defective» 2.
In the Postscript written on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of 
NLNR, he has claimed that «the book’s programme» is to «trace the ways in 
which sound laws, in all their positivity and mutability, are to be derived [...] 
from unchanging principles [...] that have their force from their reasonable-
1 Finnis, J., «Oxford Conversations with John Finnis: What is New Classical Natural Law The-
ory?», https://oxfordconversations.org/john-finnis-scholars, 2016 (April 23, 2020).
2 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 3.
THE THREE LEVELS OF LAW’S GOODNESS AND THEN ONE MORE
PERSONA Y DERECHO / VOL. 83 / 2020/2 523
ness» 3. Elsewhere he has added that «the reasonableness and justification» of 
the acts of «making, acknowledging, and complying with law [...] cannot be 
assessed without premises about true human good» 4. This cluster of Finnis’s 
arguments announces, in a nutshell, the main thread of my present effort to 
trace out the principal implications of Finnis’s thesis that the «drive to insulate 
legal from moral reasoning can never, however, be complete» 5.
At the same time, Finnis’s account of law’s «goodness» includes also the 
criteria for delimiting the domain in which law cannot be «reduced without 
remainder to ethics», i.e. the domain in which it is evident that the goals of 
law are «more limited than ethics’ unbounded horizon of human good» 6. Ac-
cordingly, this paper will present Finnis’s outline of the boundaries that «cut 
off» those aspects of the «good» which remain outside of the intersection with 
law’s ontology. In the second part of the article, however, I will argue that the 
broader «horizon of the human good» may be envisioned as juridical in ways 
that Finnis does not seem to take into full consideration, while at the same 
time respecting the due limits between moral and juridical domains.
A reader familiar with the foundational issues of Finnis’s juridical phi-
losophy will have the opportunity, in the first part of the article, not only 
to revisit, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of NLNR, these issues 
in Finnis’s key texts, but also to reread them from the vantage point of law’s 
goodness. In the second part of the article I will tackle an additional important 
aspect of the goodness of law that is partly only implicit in, and partly com-
pletely missing from, Finnis’s account, namely, the aspect of the juridical good 
as this is outlined in Thomas Aquinas’s texts.
The course of this paper actually reflects rather well my own personal 
reasons for celebrating the fortieth anniversary of NLNR together with its au-
thor and other contributors to this volume. Finnis’s thought presented in that 
book, and further developed in his writings during the last forty years, has left 
a decisive mark on my juridical-philosophical thinking, and this remark refers 
both to those among his arguments that have added much clarity to the way 
I conceptualize the nature of law today, and those from which I learned most 
3 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 418.
4 Finnis, J., «Introduction», Philosophy of Law. Collected Essays: Volume IV, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 1.
5 Finnis, J., «Legal Reasoning as Practical Reason», Reason in Action. Collected Essays: Volume I, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 229.
6 Finnis, J., «A Grand Tour of Legal Theory», Philosophy of Law..., op. cit., p. 111. 
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by critically challenging them. While on this occasion my principal intention 
is to revisit with enthusiasm the former group of arguments, the critique pre-
sented in the second part of the paper should also be read as an, illustratively 
speaking, «photographical negative» of gratitude to an author whom I con-
sider a true professor.
ii. laW’s gooDness: tWo geneRal PRemises
Before embarking upon the survey of the levels of the overlap between 
the concept of law and the concept of good in Finnis’s theory, two general 
premises are in order. They will help us in grasping the general framework 
within which Finnis elaborates the various aspects of what I here refer to 
as «law’s goodness». The first premise serves as an introduction to Finn-
is’s general understanding that law is substantively connected to the realm 
of the good. The second premise situates this general understanding of 
law’s goodness in the broader context of, in Finnis’s words, law’s ontological 
«life».
II.1. First Premise: The «More than Purely Formal» Goodness of Law
Already from the first chapters of NLNR it is clear that the points of es-
sential continuity between the good and the law stand at the heart of Finnis’s 
project under the conceptual umbrella of reasons for action. Goods and reasons 
for action are practically synonymous in Finnis’s theory. He will say that, both 
in the moral and in the juridical sense, «the central case of reasons is not what 
are commonly accepted as reasons, but reasons good as reasons» 7. In other 
words:
«Some reasons are reasons for judging it to be true (or certainly not 
true) that some state of affairs that one might help bring about by doing 
something would be beneficial, worth bringing about. Call these reasons 
practical [...] reasons for action» 8.
7 Finnis, J., «A Grand Tour of Legal Theory», Philosophy of Law..., op. cit., p. 126.
8 Finnis, J., «Introduction», Reason in Action..., op. cit., p. 1. 
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Practical goodness is thus, in Finnis’s system, defined 9 in terms of «re-
sponsiveness to reasons (intelligible goods)» 10 which «give ground for intel-
ligent action motivated ultimately by a basic human good (more precisely, by 
the intelligible benefit promised by the instantiation of a basic good)» 11.
Now, just as the basic human goods are goods essentially understood as 
expressing our practical thinking, and thus representing good reasons for action 
in the moral domain 12, so the positive laws represent reasons for action in the 
juridical domain. In NLNR, Finnis says that:
«In any event, authority is useless for the common good unless the sti-
pulations of those in authority [...] are treated as exclusionary reasons, i.e. as 
sufficient reason for acting notwithstanding that subjects would not themselves 
have made the same stipulation and indeed consider the actual stipulation to 
be in some respect(s) unreasonable, not fully appropriate for the common 
good» 13.
«The law provides the citizen, like the judge, with strongly exclusionary 
moral reasons for acting or abstaining from actions» 14.
9 «The concepts of reason for action, intelligible end, intrinsic point, and understood good implic-
itly define one another (rather like the concepts of circle, radius, and circumference)». Finnis, J., 
Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 60.
10 Finnis, J., «On Hart’s Ways: Law as Reason and as Fact», Philosophy of Law..., op. cit., p. 239.
11 Finnis, J., «Legal Reasoning as Practical Reason», op. cit., p. 213. Without entering into much 
detail of Finnis’s account of goods in the moral domain, for our present purposes suffice it to 
say that basic human goods are those instantiations of human nature that are idementified by 
the human practical reason as constitutive of the fundamental aspects of human flourishing and, 
therefore, as the ultimate reasons for action. See Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, 
op. cit., pp. 59-103, 419, 440; idem, «Legal Reasoning as Practical Reason», op. cit., p. 214; idem, 
«Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», Duke, G., and george, R. P. (eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 18-
22. These goods are, in his view, «picked out» by the basic principles of practical reasonableness, 
which thereby «direct» persons towards the goods. See Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, op. cit., pp. 419, 440, 442. The complex structural unity of basic human goods picked 
out as reasons for action by the basic principles of practical reasonableness constitutes the first 
principles of natural law. Vid., Finnis, J., «‘Natural Law’», Reason in Action..., op. cit., p. 205. 
In the most complete, but still «open-ended» list, Finnis includes the following «basic kinds 
of intelligible human good»: «life and health, marital/procreative union, knowledge, friendly 
association, artistic accomplishment, friendship with the divine transcendent source of all these 
goods, and practical reasonableness in actualizing all these intrinsic, self-evidement forms of 
human good, these aspects or elements of wellbeing». See Finnis, J., «Aquinas and Natural Law 
Jurisprudence», op. cit., pp. 18-19.
12 Vid., Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 59, 64, 77-78, 443, 451.
13 Vid., ibid, pp. 351-352. Emphasis added. 
14 Ibid., p. 319. Emphasis added.
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Are the reasons for action arising from the basic human moral goods and 
reasons for juridical action generated at the level of juridical norms somehow 
essentially connected? Do they, at least at these points of connection, pertain 
to the same group of reasons for action, i.e. to the same domain of goodness? 
Or, in Finnis’s own words, «what sort of good reasons are there for think-
ing that laws or other social norms can and sometimes do give good reasons 
for acting» 15? Before we analyse in more detail his account of law’s goodness 
across various theoretical levels in the following sections of the paper, we must 
already now emphasize, on a general level, that Finnis gives an affirmative 
answer to the above questions. Laws are truly reasons for action insofar as 
they are somehow, proximately or remotely, linked to issues pertaining to the 
domain of substantive morality and basic human goods, i.e. insofar as they 
are substantively good reasons for action. Even though this simple argument 
is underlying the entire line of analysis in NLNR, it seems that Finnis found 
ways to make it explicit in its summary form only in the aftermath of NLNR:
«Making, acknowledging, and complying with law involves acts of ratio-
nal judgment. The reasonableness and justification of these acts cannot be 
assessed without premises about true human goods» 16.
«Those goods [that are the objects of action which actualize human ca-
pacities thereby revealing human nature] are the reasons we have for action, 
and nothing in [...] legal theory is well understood save by attending to those 
goods with full attention to their intrinsic worth, the ways they fulfil and 
perfect human persons, and their directiveness or normativity for all thin-
king about what is to be done» 17.
«The [primary] reality of laws and legal institutions [...] is as reasons for 
action which are good because intelligibly related to (albeit usually not dedu-
cible from!) the basic reasons for action, the basic goods, the intrinsic values 
at stake in human action, ant to their integral unfolding in moral standards» 18.
Thus, as Johanna Fröhlich rightfully notes while commenting on Finn-
is’s account of law as reason for action, Finnis develops a «unified model of 
reasons for action», meaning that there exists a field of overlap – as she says, 
15 Finnis, J., «Positivism and ‘Authority’», Philosophy of Law..., op. cit., p. 77.
16 Finnis, J., «Introduction», Reason in Action..., op. cit., p. 1.
17 Finnis, J., «A Grand Tour of Legal Theory», op. cit., p. 98.
18 Ibid., p. 123.
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«only one type of reasons» – between law’s normative and authoritative rea-
sons for action and its meta-juridical substantive goodness 19. This means that 
Finnis considers law’s goodness to denote more than simply intra-systemic, 
formal goodness that would essentially consist in the quality of constituting 
appropriate means to an end defined as «good» entirely within the realm of 
the legal system, and sealed off from all other possible conceptions of the 
good. His account of law’s goodness thus certainly transcends Hans Kelsen’s 
conception of law’s goodness which is basically reducible to the standard of 
merely following the authoritative rules intra-systemically stipulated accord-
ing to the prescribed legislative (or otherwise normatively generating) proce-
dures 20. On the other hand, Finnis’s account of laws as «exclusionary moral» 21 
reasons for action is far more inclusive with regard to substantive moral goods 
than Joseph Raz’s thesis on laws as reasons for action whose exclusionary in-
tra-systemic nature generally trumps appeals to extra-legal substantive moral 
goods on all occasions where the relevance of these goods might be applica-
ble 22.
When the content of «goodness» predicable of law is monopolized by 
a positivist account of law’s intra-systemic authority, the issue of the overlap 
between the «law» and the «good» risks collapsing into paradoxical and gro-
tesque scenarios where laws become successfully deployed for, as Finnis says, 
«more or less amoral objectives or immoral purposes» 23. Finnis has elsewhere 
quoted Thomas Aquinas’s argument on this grotesque paradox: when intrin-
sic «goodness» is mistaken with intra-systemic «efficiency» the only juridi-
19 FRöhliCh, J., «Law as Reason for Action», selleRs; M., and kiRste, S. (eds.), Encyclopedia of 
the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Springer, Dordrecht, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-
007-6730-0_215-1, 2018 (April 23, 2020).
20 «The concept of law [is not] outsideme the concept of the good. For the concept of the ‘good’ 
cannot be defined otherwise than as that which ought to be: that which conforms to a social 
norm; and if law is defined as norm, then this implies that what is lawful is ‘good’». kelsen, 
H., Pure Theory of Law, Trans. M. Knight, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
1967, p. 66.
21 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 319.
22 Vid., Raz, J., Practical Reason and Norms, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 36-84, 182-
194; idem, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2009, pp. 28-33; idem, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical 
Reason, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 143-147. For Finnis’s partial and critical 
reception of Raz’s argument on laws as exclusionary moral reasons for action, vid., Finnis, J., 
Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 233-234, 246, 255, 319, 351-352.
23 Finnis, J., «The Nature of Law», Tasioulas, J. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy 
of Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020, pp. 54-55.
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cal-evaluative standard of reference regarding tyrannical and iniquitous laws 
is their efficiency-based «goodness», i.e., goodness envisioned «not simply 
[simpliciter], but with respect [secundum quid] to that particular government» 24. 
While Aquinas spoke of «good robbers» 25 when providing an example of the 
purely formal, efficient means-to-an-end conception of «goodness» compat-
ible with intrinsically immoral actions and reasons for such action, Finnis has 
frequently used the example of «good Nazis» 26 or «the justice of quasi-com-
munist notions of a borderless humanity» 27, for the same purposes.
In sum, if the central question of a natural law theory of law is «how and 
why can law and its positing in legislation, judicial decisions, and customs give 
its subjects sound reasons for acting in accordance with it» 28, each version of 
Finnis’s answer instantiates an appeal to an aspect of law’s goodness ultimately 
rooted in basic reasons for action, i.e., basic human goods:
«The theory or philosophy of law, then, is best done by tracing the hu-
man needs to which law – legal system and the rule of law – is a uniquely 
appropriate kind of response. These needs constitute the basic reasons for 
action which are available to make law a set of reasons for action» 29.
«To inform its understanding of the goods common to all human persons 
[...] the philosophy of law (and of laws) draws directly from ethics. That 
understanding takes the form of practical reason’s very first principles, di-
recting us to all the basic human goods» 30.
24 S.Th., I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 4. For the English translation of the texts from Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologiae, I will be using aquinas, T., Summa Theologiae: First Complete American Edition in 
Three Volumes, Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Benziger Brothers, New 
York, 1947-1948. For Finnis’s treatment of this Aquinas’s passage, see Finnis, J., Natural Law 
and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 367-368; idem, «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., 
p. 48. 
25 S.Th., I-II, q. 92, a. 1.
26 Finnis, J., «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., p. 48. See also his claim that the 
central case of a legal system is certainly not that of «radically corrupted Potemkin systems such 
as Hitler’s or Stalin’s». Finnis, J., «Response», Villanova Law Review, 57 (2012), p. 931. For 
similar comparisons, see also Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 11.
27 Finnis, J., «What is the Philosophy of Law?», The American Journal of Jurisprudence, vol. 59, 
2014, p. 142.
28 Finnis, J., «Natural Law Theories», The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Zalta, E.N. (ed.), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/natural-law-theories/, 2016 (April 24, 
2020), p. 1.
29 Finnis, J., «Law as Fact and as Reason for Action: A Response to Robert Alexy on Law’s ‘Ide-
meal Dimension’», The American Journal of Jurisprudence, vol. 59, 2014, p. 93.
30 Finnis, J., «What is the Philosophy of Law?», op. cit., p. 135.
THE THREE LEVELS OF LAW’S GOODNESS AND THEN ONE MORE
PERSONA Y DERECHO / VOL. 83 / 2020/2 529
II.2. Second Premise: The Double Life of Law
Providing good juridical reasons for action constitutes only one of the 
law’s two «lives». The ontology of law, in Finnis’s understanding, includes 
likewise the vector that, although inherently related to aspects of its goodness, 
is ultimately observable as a relatively autonomous domain, namely, the life of 
law historically manifested as a social fact promulgated in the form of the – con-
stitutional, legislative, adjudicative, customary – source of juridical obligation. 
In short, it is the life of law as a source-based social fact.
Finnis’s awareness of law’s twofold ontology – including the vector of 
goodness and the vector of source-based social fact – is documented already in 
NLNR. At this stage of his work, his primary goal was to adequately establish 
the vector of law’s goodness, since the reference to law’s life as exclusively a 
social fact – the so-called source thesis – was practically the default position, at 
least in legal academia’s positivist department 31. Thus, in NLNR he states that 
a distinctive feature of legal order is:
«that legal thinking (i.e. the law) brings what precision and predictability 
it can into the order of human interactions by a special technique: the trea-
ting of (usually datable) past acts (whether of enactment, adjudication, or 
any of the multitude of exercises of public and private ‘powers’) as giving 
now, sufficient and exclusionary reason for acting in a way then ‘provided 
for’» 32.
In order to emphasize, however, how the «reason for acting» from the 
above quote actually gives rise to a discrete life of law, though not separate 
from its social-factual source-based – both historical and forward-looking – 
existence, in the Postscript to NLNR he will say that:
31 For Finnis’s assessment of the past and present status of legal positivism in the academia, and 
for his argument that the central claims of legal positivism are actually a «johnny-come-lately» 
position in legal philosophy, see Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 418-419; 
Finnis, J., «Introduction», Philosophy of Law..., op. cit., p. 2; Finnis, J., «Law as Fact and as Rea-
son for Action...», op. cit., p. 97. For arguably the clearest positivist summary of the central claim 
of the source thesis – «A law is source-based if its existence and content can be idementified by 
reference to social facts alone, without resort to any evaluative argument» – vid., Raz, J., Ethics 
in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, 
p. 211. Vid., also idem, The Authority of Law..., op. cit., pp. 37-52. 
32 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 269.
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«the idea that ‘all law is identified by reference to social facts [of legislation, 
adjudication, etc.] alone’ is unsustainable [...]. Juristic thought about sources 
and validity conditions cannot reasonably proceed (and does not) without 
reference to a wide range of ‘evaluative arguments’» 33.
In the years after NLNR, Finnis will refer to this composite state of af-
fairs relative to law’s ontology as the «double» or «dual» life of law 34. More 
than a simple «metaphor» 35, the claim that law has a double life is a claim 
regarding law’s ontological status 36. This status is made up of (1) social facts repre-
senting material, historical, and formally still valid sources of juridical obliga-
tion, and (2) the ongoing process of evaluation that these sources have constituted 
sufficiently good reasons for juridical action on the relevant occasions in the past, 
and still do today.
Finnis’s argument cannot be highlighted enough: ontologically speaking, 
laws are not only source-based social-factual artifacts; law’s practical view-
point, together with its corresponding consecutive levels of law’s goodness, 
is an essential part of law’s ontology 37. To disregard any of the two «lives» 
is to misunderstand the ontology of that entity that we refer to as law. On 
the other hand, it is possible, according to Finnis, to approach the concept 
of law from the standpoint of each of its «lives» or ontological aspects – i.e. 
from its source-based factuality or from the relevant levels, taken together, of 
its goodness – without disregarding the other 38. In his view, «one can switch 
33 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 472.
34 Finnis, J., «A Grand Tour of Legal Theory», op. cit., pp. 101-102, 107; idem, «Adjudication and 
Legal Change», Philosophy of Law..., op. cit., pp. 397, 402; idem, «Reflections and Responses», in 
Keon, J., and George, R.P. (eds.), Reason, Morality and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 547; idem, «Law as Fact and as Reason for Action...», op. cit., 
pp. 95-96; idem, «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., pp. 47-48; idem, «Natural 
Law Theories», op. cit., Introduction.
35 Finnis, J., «Adjudication and Legal Change», op. cit., p. 402; idem, «Law as Fact and as Reason 
for Action...», op. cit., p. 96.
36 Finnis, J., «Reflections and Responses», op. cit., pp. 519, 556.
37 «Though human law is artefact and artifice, and not a conclusion from moral premises, both its 
positing and the recognition of its positivity (by judges, professionals, citizens, and thence by 
descriptive and critical scholars) cannot be understood without reference to the moral principles 
that ground and confirm its authority or challenge its pretention». Finnis, J., «The Truth in 
Legal Positivism», Philosophy of Law..., op. cit., p. 186.
38 «Natural law theory accepts that law can be considered and spoken of both as a sheer social 
fact of power and practice, and as a set of reasons for action that can be and often are sound as 
reasons and therefore normative for reasonable people addressed by them». Finnis, J., «Natural 
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between» both ontological aspects of the law in «thinking and talking about 
[law], and everyone regularly does» 39. Keeping both aspects, both «lives», 
in focus 40 when conceptualizing law on all levels of juridical discourse has 
constituted Finnis’s persistent effort throughout his academic career and, in 
my opinion, he cannot be given enough credit for this effort. The constant 
tension between descriptive and normative-evaluative standpoints is the only 
adequate way to tackle with all the relevant issues pertaining to law’s twofold 
ontology. Finnis seems to suggest that the internal dynamics of this tension 
has a two-way reflexive character; law’s being a good reason for action is – at 
least partially, but necessarily – founded upon «the fact of its positing» 41, while 
the material source of juridical obligation owes its factual existence to being 
«envisaged as a reason by a law-maker who has the capacity to make it (by en-
actment or binding precedent) become a reason for action for its subjects» 42. 
The two «lives» of law are inseparable, or, better yet, constitute two aspects of 
law’s single «life» 43. Together, they «make law what it is» 44.
Law Theories», op. cit., Introduction. «Law’s existence, force, and effect – its life – can always 
thus be understood as sheer fact (historical or predictable) or alternatively as directive stand-
ard». Finnis, J., «Adjudication and Legal Change», op. cit., p. 397.
39 Finnis, J., «Adjudication and Legal Change», op. cit., p. 402.
40 See, for example, the following Finnis’s argument, constantly switching gears between the two as-
pects: «Considered precisely as genuine reasons for action, positive laws are social facts which count 
as reasons – as positive law – just insofar as morality makes their social sources and their social-fact 
content count. [...] But what makes a reason a good reason for action can, in the last analysis, never 
be a fact, such as fact about what [...] is in fact, reasonably or unreasonably, counted as law in par-
ticular communities and sub-communities». Finnis, J., «A Grand Tour of Legal Theory», op. cit., 
pp. 106-107. «There is thus a movement to and fro between, on the one hand, assessments of human 
goods and of its practical requirements, and on the other hand, explanatory descriptions». Finnis, 
J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 17. «Does it matter where you start? No. You can start 
with the social facts about what is called law [...] or you can start as I do in NLNR [...], go directly 
to the needs to which law is the generically most satisfactory kind of response, and trace out that 
complex of ends and means». Finnis, J., «Reflections and Responses», op. cit., p. 551. 
41 Finnis, J., «Law as Fact and as Reason for Action...», op. cit., p. 95.
42 Ibid., p. 95.
43 «It is only in recent years that I have suggested that the purposes of descriptive theory can and 
should all be pursued, not outside and parallel with critically evaluative-justificatory theory, but 
instead as an element within the latter. [...] Practical reasonings, and therefore [...] legal theory, 
require extensive empirical information, selected and processed so as to be of service in deliberating 
about what to do as an individual, a family, an economy, political community and legal system...». 
Finnis, J., «Reflections and Responses», op. cit., p. 537. Emphasis added. 
44 «What makes law what it is? Social facts. (They are its ‘material’ and ‘efficient’ causes.) Unless there 
is factual acceptance of actual acts of legislation and adjudication, law cannot possibly achieve its 
normative point or create legal or moral obligation. What makes social facts so utterly central to 
law? Human needs, vulnerabilities, scarcities, and ways of flourishing or losing out». Ibid., p. 552.
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iii. the thRee leVels oF laW’s gooDness
Having established that Finnis’s account of the nature of law generally 
refers to an ontological overlap with the domain of the substantive good, it is 
now time to explore the various levels of this overlap and verify how exactly (in 
what ways), in Finnis’s view, law may be considered to be good. This enterprise 
reaches the deepest foundations of Finnis’s legal philosophy, and each level of 
law’s goodness represents a sui generis answer to questions regarding justifica-
tion 45 and limits 46 of law, i.e. a line that delimits laws as good reasons for action 
from less than good or downright bad reasons.
III.1. First Level: The Practical Viewpoint
As already implied by the general overview of the schema of the law’s 
«double life», Finnis has consistently maintained – throughout his texts and 
at least since that famous first chapter of his NLNR, entitled «Evaluation and 
the Description of Law» – that the ontology of law is not enclosed only within 
the descriptive realm of its being a factual source of juridical obligation and of 
the correlative conditions for the validity of such a source. To fully understand 
the dynamics and the products of acts such as legislation or adjudication, as 
45 «The reasonableness and justification of these acts [of rational judgement relative to making, 
acknowledging, and complying with law] cannot be assessed without premises about true human 
goods». Finnis, J., «Introduction», Philosophy of Law..., op. cit., p. 1. Emphasis added. «One of 
the central enterprises of legal theory [is] the explanation and justification, in principle, of the 
law’s moral authority»; idem, «Law’s Authority and Social Theory’s Predicament», Philosophy of 
Law..., op. cit., p. 46. Emphasis added. 
46 «Everything sound in a philosophical account of positive law can be given in the course of an 
account of law’s moral necessity and moral limits». Finnis, J., «Law as Fact and as Reason for 
Action...», op. cit., p. 98. «Aquinas’s position about [...] natural moral law [...] providemes human 
positive law with its justification and rational limits»; idem, «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurispru-
dence», op. cit., p. 22. Emphasis added. The question of the limits of positive law appears as the 
central aim of NLNR, according to Finnis’s (first?) outline of the book, dated 14 January 1968, 
produced for the purposes of informing the editor, H.L.A. Hart, and the publisher, Clarendon 
Law Series at the Oxford University Press, about the goals and the main topics of the book: 
«Aim: About 80,000 words, seeking to indicate, primarily to law students, various problems 
of the limits of (‘positive’) law and the way men have tried to answer these by linking law with 
(other) features of the nature of the world or society of men». The outline is published as an 
Appendix in legaRRe, S., «HLA Hart and the Making of the New Natural Law Theory», Ju-
risprudence, vol. 8, 2017, pp. 97-98. Emphasis added.
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well as the purposefulness or the function of law, and the ways in which cit-
izens have considered to be, and still do today, under obligation of the law’s 
content, in short, to fully understand law’s essence, one cannot prescind from the 
perspective of law’s practical (evaluative or normative) viewpoint.
Already from that opening chapter of NLNR, it is obvious that, for Finn-
is, there is something essential in the nature of law as a social institution that 
necessarily implies «the work of evaluation, of understanding what is really 
good for human persons, and what is really required by practical reasonable-
ness» 47. This «something», namely, the practical viewpoint of the requirements 
of reasonableness, forms part of the central case of the legal viewpoint (as op-
posed to a peripheral case) 48, or, as Finnis elsewhere notes, of the concept 49 of 
law and of its «ontological basis or substance» 50. As such, «it should be used 
as the standard of reference by the theorist describing the feature of legal 
order» 51. The law’s practical standpoint, in Finnis’s assessment, includes the 
commitment to «decide what the requirements of practical reasonableness re-
ally are» 52, and this commitment extends itself to all juridically relevant aspects 
of human affairs 53.
The question that arises on this most foundational level of the overlap 
between the law and the good is whether the aspect of the practical viewpoint 
in law’s ontology (its nature and concept) already somehow constitutes law’s 
47 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 3.
48 Ibid., pp. 9-11, 14-15.
49 «A jurisprudence which aspires to be more than the lexicography of a particular culture cannot 
solve its theoretical problems of definition or concept-formation unless it draws upon at least some 
of the considerations of values and principles of practical reasonableness which are the sub-
ject-matter of ‘ethics’ (or ‘political philosophy’)». Ibid., p. 358. Emphasis added.
50 Finnis, J., «Reflections and Responses», op. cit., pp. 519, 556. 
51 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 15. 
52 Ibid., p. 16. Finnis’s argument does not stop there: «In relation to law, the most important things 
for the theorist to know and describe are the things which, in the judgement of the theorist, 
make it important from a practical viewpoint to have law – the things which it is, therefore, to 
‘see to’ when ordering human affairs».
53 For Finnis’s claim that it was really H.L.A. Hart who has opened up the way for the un-
derstanding of the essence of law not only from the social-factual, but also from a practi-
cal standpoint of reasons for juridical action (Hart’s emphasis on persons’ «internal point of 
view» regarding law), as well as for Finnis’s critique of Hart’s moral skepticism and the latter’s 
consequent reluctance to firmly establish the content of the requirements of the practical rea-
sonableness, see Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 12-14; idem, «A Grand 
Tour of Legal Theory», op. cit., pp. 119-120; idem, «On Hart’s Ways: Law as Reason and as 
Fact», op. cit., pp. 230-256.
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goodness even prior to the exact identification of the basic human goods, the 
requirements of practical reasonableness, and their concrete connections to 
legal matters. Does the concept of law somehow overlap with the good already 
at the level of its inherently practical viewpoint? Does the fact that there is 
something in the nature of law that necessarily, but at this level only generally, 
gestures towards an evaluative orderedness in human affairs – i.e. law’s inev-
itable aptness to, as Finnis says, «change the world» 54 of those same human 
affairs according to some axiological standard – already constitute a significant 
aspect of its goodness?
One can certainly find vestiges of a positive answer to the above ques-
tions in Finnis’s texts. It is certain that, as Finnis notes in connection to a 
congenial topic, that this general practical orientation «must, to make sense, 
refer to some good or goods (human need or needs)» 55, that is «to reason [for 
action] only if it is a reason which is good precisely as a reason» 56. The practical 
viewpoint that is already in principle oriented towards the search not just for 
any set of reasons for action, but for all the objectively good reasons for action 
that may soundly be established, such as the viewpoint advocated by Finnis, is 
one that, as he himself says, «undertakes a critique of practical viewpoints, in 
order to distinguish the practically unreasonable from practically reasonable, 
and thus to differentiate the really important from that which is unimportant 
or is important only by its opposition to or unreasonable exploitation of the 
really important» 57.
Now, practical theorizing about law that, as Finnis says, «proceeds by 
looking not for conceptual necessities but rather for human needs and ap-
propriate responses» already seems to represent, in my opinion, a princi-
pled openness to objectively existing forms of human good. The practical 
viewpoint – at least to the extent that it represents a general and principled 
openness to the identification and attainment of juridically relevant objective 
human goods – already represents an introductory level, an antechamber so 
to speak, of law’s goodness. The application itself of this viewpoint in legal 
54 Finnis, J., «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., p. 45. See also Finnis’s claim that 
«the point of law is to change things for the better in the community whose law it is». Finnis, J., 
«Freedom, Benefit and Understanding: Reflections on Laurence Claus’s Critique of Authority», 
San Diego Law Review, vol. 51, 2014, p. 907.
55 Finnis, J., «Introduction», Philosophy of Law..., op. cit., p. 4.
56 Finnis, J., «A Grand Tour of Legal Theory», op. cit., p. 107.
57 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 18.
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reasoning certainly participates to a degree in the goodness of one of Finnis’s 
basic goods, namely the good of practical reasonableness, 58 in the form of leg-
islative practical reasonableness 59.
III.2. Second Level: Law’s Systemic Moral Value
The second level of law’s goodness consists in Finnis’s cluster of argu-
ments relative to what is usually referred to in legal philosophy as systemic 
moral value of law as an institution 60, in response to questions such as «why 
have law, as a system, at all?».
58 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 88-89, 100-101; idem, «Grounding Hu-
man Rights in Natural Law», The American Journal of Jurisprudence, vol, 60, 2015, pp. 206-208; 
idem, «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., pp. 18-21. 
59 Finnis, J., Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, op. cit., pp. 236-237. The legal-philosoph-
ical work of Verónica Rodríguez-Blanco represents an important development in the under-
standing of precisely this first level of what I here refer to as law’s goodness. Without entering 
into the analysis of the goodness of law from the standpoint of traced-out concrete aspects 
of objective human good, Rodríguez-Blanco explores the order of juridical reasons for action 
at the level of their being, already in principle, «good-making characteristics» that «ground 
the rules, decisions and legal directives». RoDRíguez-blanCo, V., «Practical Reason in the 
Context of Law», Duke, G., and George, R.P. (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law 
Jurisprudence, op. cit., pp. 176, 180, 181, 184-185. In a rather complex but very illuminative 
argument, Rodríguez-Blanco observes the law from the perspective of what she calls its specif-
ic «logos», namely, the nature of law understood not as fully concluded social-factual product 
or artifact, but from the standpoint of diachronically actualisable orderedness of reasons that 
instantiate practical «good-making characteristics» dynamically interlocked across time in the 
minds and actions of legislators, judges and law-abing citizens. «Our argumentative strategy 
has been to bring attention to the dynamic structure of practical reason and to show that the 
underlying structure of complex artifacts, including legal systems, is the structure of practical 
reason. Law-makers create law as an artifact invoking good-making characteristics and making 
it possible for citizens to understand the reasons of the law as good-making characteristics. We 
have focused on the idea that law is an activity that unfolds within the structure of reasons as 
values and principles». RoDRíguez-blanCo, V., «Processes and Artifacts: The Principles are 
in the Author Herself», in Burazin, L., Himma, K.E., and Roversi, C. (eds.), Law as an Arti-
fact, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, p. 212. For more details on Rodríguez-Blanco’s 
above-described position in connection to her claim that «legal rules and good things, events 
or states of affairs are not absolutely distinct from one another», vid., RoDRíguez-blanCo, V., 
Law and Authority under the Guise of the Good, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014 (the quote is from 
p. 213.).
60 Even a contemporary legal positivist par excellence like Joseph Raz is prepared to concede that 
«there is a moral property, being morally valuable, which all law has by its very nature», and 
that this property concerns some specific «moral task» that is «central to the law, essential to 
its being the type of institution it is». This systemic moral task, according to Raz, is «to secure 
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In a way that is in harmony with the general direction of his natural-law 
position, Finnis grounds the systemic moral value of law in the framework of 
responsiveness to human needs. Rather than constituting a purely conven-
tional or artifactual institutional response to certain human expectations for 
purposeful techniques, in the Finnisian perspective, law as an institution or as 
a concept corresponds to a determinate set of human needs 61. As Finnis notes 
in NLNR, the concern of the tradition of natural law theorizing is «to show 
that the act of ‘positing’ law (whether judicially or legislatively or otherwise) 
is an act which can and should be guided by ‘moral’ principles and rules; that 
those moral norms are a matter of objective reasonableness, not of whim, 
convention, or mere ‘decision’; and that those same moral norms justify [...] 
the very institution of positive law» 62. Elsewhere, he has argued that good legal 
reasons for action include reasons for having law at all 63.
In sum, and without ambition to exhaustively present the whole of Finn-
is’s thought on the subject, his overall position regarding law’s systemic good-
ness is mirrored in his claims that the moral 64 point of having law as an insti-
tution corresponds to human needs, such as those for justice 65, peace 66, and 
coordination in view of the common good 67:
«In the domain of law as a [...] morally significant human enterprise, the 
need that grounds and informs normativity is the complex need for peace, 
justice (including compensatory, retributive and corrective justice) and the 
a situation whereby moral goals which [...] would be unlikely to be achieved without it [...] are 
realized», like authority-based issues of social coordination, including the peaceful resolutions 
of conflicts. Raz, J., Between Authority and Interpretation, op. cit., pp. 175-181. 
61 «What best explains the features law has [...] is its [...] character as a response to human commu-
nities’ morally significant need for the kind of access to justice that only law systematically proves». 
Finnis, J., «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., p. 50. Emphasis added.
62 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 290. Emphasis added.
63 Finnis, J., «Positivism and ‘Authority’», op. cit., p. 81; idem, «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurispru-
dence», op. cit., p. 51.
64 «No understanding and no philosophical account of the nature of law as a distinct kind of social 
institution is satisfactory unless, in it, the idea of both rulers and ruled being governed by law is un-
derstood and presented as a moral idea». Finnis, J., «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», 
op. cit., p. 45. Emphasis added.
65 Finnis, J., «Describing Law Normatively», Philosophy of Law..., op. cit., pp. 24-28; idem, «Reflec-
tions and Responses», op. cit., p. 552.
66 Finnis, J., «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., pp. 39-40. 
67 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 231-233, 276; idem, Aquinas: Moral, Po-
litical, and Legal Theory, op. cit., pp. 255-258; idem, «Law as Coordination», Philosophy of Law..., 
op. cit., pp. 69-73; idem, «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., pp. 27-28; 
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avoidance of anarchy and tyranny. That complex of needs can be traced to 
its roots in the needs that are identified as normatively significant in the first 
principles of practical reason directing us to the basic human goods». 68
III.3. Third Level: Basic Human Goods and the Law
But what is the quality of the connection between law and basic human 
goods, i.e. between juridical reasons for action and basic practically reasonable 
reasons for action? In what sense do basic human goods, such as human life, 
enter within the necessary conceptual range of law as an institution, at least 
with regard to the aspect of the practical viewpoint inherent to law’s ontology?
In NLNR, Finnis argued that «true, some parts of the legal system com-
monly do, and certainly should, consist of rules and principles closely corre-
sponding to requirements of practical reason which themselves are conclusions 
directly from the combination of a particular basic value (e.g. life) with one 
or more of [...] basic ‘methodological’ requirements of practical reasonable-
ness» 69. From the social-factual standpoint within law’s double life, it is clear 
that, since law is a specific source-based artifactual and institutional social 
technique, basic human goods do not automatically replicate themselves to 
form part of the positive legal norms. As Finnis says, «the process of receiving 
even such straightforward moral precepts into the legal system» involves spe-
cific and complex causal intervention by those who are responsible the act of 
positing law as a source-based artifact in the political community 70.
On the other hand, since law’s ontology, according to Finnis, essentially 
includes also the aspect of the practical viewpoint and its consecutive levels of 
goodness, it is clear that the word «should» in the above quote from NLNR 
(namely, that parts of the legal system «should» correspond to basic human 
goods) does not have a purely exhortative meaning. Quite the contrary, Finn-
is argues that «the law’s institutions – to the extent that they are reasonable 
[...] remain dependent», and I would add remain ontologically dependent with 
68 Finnis, J., «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., p. 41.
69 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 282. Emphasis added.
70 Ibid., pp. 281-284: «Some positive laws are also norms of the natural moral law – that is, are 
requirements of practical reasonableness. But to say this is not to detract in the least from the 
positivity of those laws – that is, from the fact (where it is the fact) that they have been posited 
humanly, by human will, and can be studied as positive». Finnis, J., «The Truth in Legal Posi-
tivism», op. cit., p. 183.
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regard to the levels of goodness arising from the practical viewpoint inherent 
to law’s life, «upon foundational moral principles which pick out the require-
ments of a reasonableness attentive to the basic human goods» 71.
From this practical viewpoint of law’s «life», both the principles closely 
related to basic human goods and these goods themselves may be spoken of 
«as belonging to law by a kind of ‘conceptual’ necessity» 72. For instance, the 
moral principle of acting in ways that forward the fulfilment of all human 
beings and their communities regarding all basic human goods and the cor-
relative principle of not destroying an instance of a basic human good for the 
sake of good, represent, according to Finnis, «the backbone of decent legal 
systems» 73. With regard to their legal protection, the basic human goods «are 
the ‘deep inside’ of all that we can and should ‘say to ourselves’ to warrant our 
decisions as law-makers, law-appliers (executive or judicial), and citizens» 74, 
and abstaining from acts conducive to the contraries of basic human goods 
(i.e. evils in themselves, «mala in se») is «required by the very same practical 
reason that the law-maker judged inherently sound and sought to refine and 
enforce» through «either penalties or other negative consequences» 75.
In sum, we could say, together with Finnis, that, from the viewpoint of 
law’s ontological connectedness to good reasons for action, «that part of our 
positive law that is, as it were, adopted from, or carried over from, or quasi-read 
off, the natural moral law», such as the part proximately relative to basic human 
goods, «is natural law» 76. Elsewhere he has said that this part of positive law is 
«a direct enforcement of certain basic moral principles and rules» 77. However, 
as Finnis adds, we should not forget that «it is at the same time positive law» 78, 
71 Finnis, J., «A Grand Tour of Legal Theory», op. cit., p. 118.
72 Finnis, J., «Natural Law Theories», op. cit., 1.4.
73 Ibid., p. 121. Vid., also, idem, «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., p. 43.
74 Finnis, J., «On Hart’s Ways: Law as Reason and as Fact», op. cit., p. 253.
75 Ibid., p. 242.
76 Finnis, J., «Coexisting Normative Orders», The American Journal of Jurisprudence, vol. 57, 2012, 
p. 116.
77 Finnis, J., «How Persistent are Hart’s ‘Persistent Questions’?», in D’Almea, L.D., Edwards, J., and 
Dolcetti, A. (eds.), Reading HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013, p. 230.
78 Finnis, J., «Coexisting Normative Orders», op. cit., p. 116. For the correlative «goodness» of 
purely positive law – namely, the part of positive law that is only remotely connected to basic 
human goods as a legislative determinatio in view of reasonable needs the juridical response to 
which is ultimately chosen between plural good options – see Finnis, J., Natural Law and Nat-
ural Rights, op. cit., pp. 284-289; idem, «Natural Law Theories», op. cit., 1.5; idem, «Aquinas and 
Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., pp. 37-38.
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from the standpoint of law’s ontology referable to its source-based social-factual 
existence.
In Finnis’s reading of Aquinas, the peculiar juridical status of the basic 
human goods as necessary evaluative standards for positive law, has a reflexive 
impact on the range of the domain covered by basic human goods, which is 
narrower 79 than the field that they cover in the moral domain. The range cov-
ered by juridical basic human goods is set according to their constitution as as-
pects of the public good: namely, according to the interpersonal (or other-directed) 
and external segment of actions regarding basic human goods that is relevant 
as a subset of the common good by being inherently relatable to issues of jus-
tice and peace in the political community 80.
The way that the paradigm of law’s double life replicates itself on this 
third level of law’s goodness is particularly illuminating with regard to some 
persistent legal-philosophical questions, like the question of the status of the 
necessary connection between law and substantive morality and the question 
of the status and validity of unjust laws.
Starting from the latter question, Finnis has spilled much ink on tackling 
its answer, from NLNR 81 to the multiple restatements of his position in subse-
quent writings 82, and, in my opinion, that ink has been put to best possible use. 
His answer, in a nutshell, is that we cannot adequately approach the question 
of the status of unjust laws without a prior understanding that law’s ontology 
may enter the mode of its internal dichotomy marked by the simultaneous co-
existence of unjust law’s factual source-based validity, on the one hand, and its 
79 «The law of the state cannot rightly regulate the full range of choices required by practical 
reasonableness». Finnis, J., Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, op. cit., p. 225.
80 «As the public good, the elements of the specifically political common good are not all-round 
virtue but goods (and virtues) which are intrinsically interpersonal, other-directed (ad alterum), 
person to person (hominum ad invicem): justice and peace». Ibid., pp. 226-227. «Public good is a 
part or aspect of the all-inclusive common good. It is the part which provides an indispensable 
context and support for those parts or aspects of the common good which are private (especially 
individual and familial good). [...] The common good specific to the civitas as such – the public 
good – is not basic but, rather, instrumental to securing human goods which are basic». Ibid., 
pp. 237, 247. See also Finnis, J., «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., p. 53; idem, 
«Coexisting Normative Orders», op. cit., pp. 112-113.
81 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 279-280, 351-368, 476.
82 Finnis, J., «A Grand Tour of Legal Theory», op. cit., p. 103; idem, «Natural Law Theory: Its 
Past and Present», The American Journal of Jurisprudence, vol. 57, 2012, p. 95; idem, «Reflections 
and Responses», op. cit., p. 553; idem, «Law as Fact and as Reason for Action...», op. cit., pp. 100-
101, 107-108; idem, «Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., pp. 41-42; «What is the 
Philosophy of Law?», op. cit., p. 140; idem, «Natural Law Theories», op. cit., 1.4.
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injustice, and thus lack of its third-level goodness from the practical viewpoint, 
on the other. In other words, while the social-factual aspect of an unjust law may 
still reflect its technical intra-systemic validity, law’s ontology from the practical 
viewpoint may at the same time definitely defeat the presumable and defeasible 
moral obligation to obey that law (in this sense, an unjust law is no law at all) 83.
A similar line of argument settles the question of the necessary connec-
tion between law and substantive morality. H.L.A. Hart gave form, perhaps 
paradigmatically so, to the positivist «no necessary connection» thesis: «there 
is no necessary connection between law and morals or law as it is and ought to 
be» 84. If we take into consideration both lives of law, factual and practical, de-
scriptive and evaluative (normative), then we can find the necessary points of 
connection between law and morality (broadly speaking) within the first (prac-
tical viewpoint 85) and second (systemic moral value 86) levels of Finnis’s account of 
law’s goodness. Laws are thus connected to the good through the inherently 
practical aspect of their ontology which generally gestures towards good rea-
sons for action, as well as through their participation in moral goodness of law 
as an institution that responds to certain human needs, ultimately relatable to 
basic human goods. If these two levels of law’s goodness collapse, we can say 
that the concept or the nature of law collapses with it.
The «necessary connection» question becomes more complicated and, 
indeed, stratified on the third level of law’s goodness. In Finnis’s understand-
ing, we cannot consider law’s third-level substantive goodness, more proxi-
mately related to basic human goods, to enter into the very concept of law to 
the degree that a law which is unjust would conceptually collapse as a source-
83 On Finnis’s reading of Aquinas’s account of collateral moral obligations that should be taken 
into considemeration as a proviso to the principle of unjust law’s lack of moral authority and 
consequent lack of moral obligation to be obeyed, see Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, 
op. cit., pp. 361-362; idem, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, op. cit., p. 273; idem, «Aqui-
nas and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., pp. 41-42.
84 haRt, H.L.A., «Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals», Essays in Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, p. 57. «My main concern [...] was to defend 
the wisdom of insisting [...] on the distinction between law as it is and law as morally it ought 
to be, against various forms of the claim that there are conceptual necessary connections, not 
merely contingent ones, between law and morality». haRt, H.L.A., «Introduction», Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 8. 
85 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 11-18; idem, «Introduction», Philosophy of 
Law..., op. cit., p. 9; idem, «The Truth in Legal Positivism», op. cit., p. 185.
86 Finnis, J., «Introduction», Philosophy of Law..., op. cit., p. 8; idem, «The Truth in Legal Positiv-
ism», op. cit., p. 185.
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based social fact within the complex and interrelated set of such facts that con-
stitute a legal system. In addition, not all laws are immediately or proximate-
ly required to have such-and-such content in reference to the basic human 
goods, as witnessed by the existence of the above mentioned purely positive 
laws. From the opposite angle, unjust laws cannot validly claim to be necessar-
ily substantively moral. In these senses, Finnis claims that we cannot speak of 
the necessary, I would add third-level, connection between law and morality 87.
But the practical or evaluative aspect of law’s ontology does constitute 
a necessary connection between law and morality on the third level of law’s 
goodness. Thus, the concept of the good enters into (i.e. constitutes a neces-
sary connection with) the concept and nature of law, at the first and second 
levels of goodness, as well as within the practical-evaluative aspect of law’s on-
tology at the third level. Finnis’s account of law’s goodness therefore renders 
the positivist «no necessary connection» thesis unintelligible in a number of 
ways. First, the aspects of law as it conceptually or systematically ought to be is, 
in fact, already included in the concept and nature of law on the first two levels 
of its goodness. Second, Finnis has himself, as we have already seen, acknowl-
edged that, given his schema of law’s bifurcated ontology, there is no necessary 
conceptual connection between law as it is (source-based social fact) and law 
as it ought to be (practical-evaluative viewpoint on law as a set of good reasons 
for action) on the third level.
This article started with a question regarding the overlap between the 
concepts of «law» and the «good». I believe that the part of my analysis rela-
tive to Finnis’s three levels of law’s goodness may now be concluded with his 
quote that, in a way, gathers all three levels:
«As a matter of fact, there is no necessary connection between law and rea-
sonableness, justice and morality; irrational and unjust laws abound, as natural 
law theory insists from earliest time until today. As a matter of practical reason, 
unreasonable (and therefore unjust and immoral) laws and legal systems are 
not what we are seeking to understand when we inquire into the reasons there 
are to make and maintain law and legal systems, and what features are essen-
tial if law and legal systems are to be acceptable – worthy of acceptance – and 
entitled to the obedience or conformity of reasonable people» 88.
87 Finnis, J., «Introduction», Philosophy of Law..., op. cit., p. 8; idem, «A Grand Tour of Legal The-
ory», op. cit., pp. 105, 112; idem, «The Truth in Legal Positivism», op. cit., pp. 184-185.
88 Finnis, J., «On Hart’s Ways: Law as Reason and as Fact», op. cit., p. 242.
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iV. the FouRth leVel oF laW’s gooDness: JuRiDiCal gooD
The overview of Finnis’s account of law’s goodness shows that his pre-
dominant concern is to establish the elements of the good that are either 
inbuilt in or necessarily (or reasonably, from a practical viewpoint) oriented 
towards the modelling of the juridical domain. Across all three levels of law’s 
goodness, Finnis’s main concern is to explain how various aspects of the good 
«afford a rational basis for the activities of legislators, judges and citizens» 89, 
«what morality has to say about law» 90, and what exactly «positive laws add 
[...] to morality’s inherent directives» 91.
On the other hand, his position regarding the second aspect of the 
overlap between the «law» and the «good», namely the question of how 
juridicity may be predicated of goodness, is mainly grounded in the prem-
ise that in order to enter into the juridical domain, the various aspects of 
the good (e.g. basic human goods, public goods of peace and justice) must 
be positivized. Even his argument on the juridicity of the good implicit in 
the claim that laws provide good juridical reasons for action presupposes 
that these reasons are posited as laws. Thus, even in their limited range 
tailor-made for the purposes of the political community’s legal attainment 
of public goods, basic human goods as good reasons for action are con-
ceived of as pre-juridical, or a-juridical, unless they are somehow positivized. 
Certainly, these goods (together with moral principles related to them) are 
«very important to the structuring of legal thought» 92. But, even when en-
visioned from the perspective of their constitution as absolute human or 
natural rights, they are again understood essentially as moral rights, not 
juridical ones 93.
In this section I would like to explore the second aspect of the overlap be-
tween the law and the good, namely, the juridicity of various instances of the 
good. This aspect orbits the question of the existence of plural focal points of 
juridicity. Are there discrete juridical entities that do not receive their juridical 
character from positive law, and, if there are, what impact would their juridic-
ity have on the levels of law’s goodness? I argue that there is a focal point of 
89 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 290.
90 Finnis, J., «A Grand Tour of Legal Theory», op. cit., pp. 105-106.
91 Ibid., p. 103.
92 Finnis, J., «Legal Reasoning as Practical Reason», op. cit., p. 216.
93 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 198-199, 223-226.
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juridicity that is sufficiently distinct from – and in certain circumstances even 
causally and ontologically, in a relative or absolute way, autonomous from – 
positive law. I also argue that this focal point of juridicity is actually central for 
the constitution of the juridical domain for Thomas Aquinas.
This focal point of juridicity is referred to by Aquinas under the rubric of 
ius, which may be considered to bring about the issue of juridical goods that are 
not reducible to the concept of law. Now, I have to say immediately that I am 
not about to reintroduce the debate on the historical occurrences of rights-talk 
or of the interchangeable use of the terms «law» and «right», nor enter into 
doctrinal discussions on objective and subjective meanings of rights 94. What 
I would like to do, instead, is to argue that Finnis’s levels of law’s goodness 
may be successfully upgraded if we broaden the perspective of the juridicity 
of aspects of the good in order to include the concept of ius as yielding, in 
a certain sense, something that may be called juridical goods. The upgrade is 
neither merely terminological, nor reducible to ultimately indifferent shifts in 
viewpoints. I will outline the way I read and interpret Aquinas’s argument on 
this issue, and parallelly explore to what extent the aspects of this argument 
may be acceptable to Finnis.
Aquinas argues that there is a way to conceptualize the juridicity of as-
pects of the good through his understanding of the juridical domain (ius) as 
the object of the virtue of justice. There is a discrete aspect of goodness under-
lying his treatment of the whole «right-justice» cluster of arguments, namely, 
that of juridical goodness, but in order to adequately understand it we must 
first see how he defines ius, i.e. right, or more broadly, the juridical domain, 
and then how he contextualized ius in the broader schema of the disposition-
al and operative principle of justice. According to Aquinas, ius is primarily – 
hence, as the focal point of juridicity – defined as the «just thing itself» (ipsa res 
iusta), «the just» (iustum) 95.
Thus, at least on a first level of analysis, Aquinas identifies ius with the 
things themselves or things as they are in themselves, in the broadest possible sense 
94 For Finnis’s contribution to these discussions, see Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, 
op. cit., pp. 205-210, 465-466; Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, op. cit., pp. 132-138; 
idem, «Aquinas on Ius and Hart on Rights», The Review of Politics, vol, 64, 2002, pp. 407-410; 
idem, «‘Natural Law’», op. cit., pp. 206-207, 211; idem, «Grounding Human Rights in Natural 
Law», op. cit., pp. 199-225; idem, «On Moyn’s Christian Human Rights (2015)», King’s Law Jour-
nal, vol, 28, 2017, pp. 14-15.
95 S.Th., II-II, q. 57, a. 1.
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of the term, as material or immaterial, natural or artifactual entities 96. He is 
quite clear in his presentation of this primary meaning of the concept of ius, 
and Finnis’s reading of this passage is almost sine glossa: «the primary meaning 
[of ius] is ‘the just thing itself’ (and by ‘thing’, as the context makes clear, he 
means acts, objects, and states of affairs, considered as subject-matters of rela-
tionships of justice)» 97.
Now, what does Aquinas mean when he says that ius is the just thing itself 
or the just? Justice does, in fact, have an essential role in determining the good-
ness of ius, as we will see, but it is not envisioned by Aquinas as interdefinable 
with the concept of ius at the risk of collapsing into mere tautology (e.g. ius 
is that which is just to the extent that justice is that which gives to each his 
ius). According to Aquinas a thing is just when it denotes a specific «kind of 
equality» 98 between plural persons, and the kind of equality that is relevant 
for the constitution of a thing as right (ius) is that which has as its final result 
the adjusting of a thing to another «without taking into account the way in 
which it [i.e. this adjusting] is done» 99. In sum, a thing that is constituted as 
ius (or right) is, first, susceptible to become the object of interpersonal or oth-
er-directed relationships; second, apt to be attributed, in the context of those 
relationships, as a suum according to its concrete measure, i.e. as «mine» or 
«ours» in distinction to «yours» or anyone else’s, which is implied in the con-
cept of «things that are made equal»; and third, external or outward, i.e. caught 
only in those of its aspects that are not exclusively related to intra-personal 
moral dispositions of persons. Some of these properties – other-directedness, 
outwardness – are covered, as we have seen, by Finnis’s somewhat different 
argument on the objects of the positive-law domain determined by reference 
to public (as opposed to various instances of private) goods.
Having determined the qualities of the thing to-be-constituted as ius, we 
can now briefly present a Thomistic argument regarding this constitution. 
Aquinas adopts Ulpian’s definition of justice from the Roman law tradition: 
the constant and perpetual will to render to each his right, ius suum cuique 
96 The term «thing» is not intended here as a conceptual tool for conferring any ontological status 
to somebody or something, thereby «reifying» or «objectivizing» them. To say, together with 
Aquinas, that right is essentially the thing itself, means to already outline the foundations «in 
re», in the reality itself, of the juridical domain.
97 Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 206.
98 S.Th., II-II, q. 57, a. 1.
99 Ibidem.
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tribuendi 100. Before being able to give to each his right (ius), we must first de-
termine what belongs to each person, i.e. which concrete things does a person 
have as his ius.
How can we do that? For example, how do other persons know that my 
life or bodily integrity is not something theirs, but exclusively mine? Aqui-
nas holds that a thing is initially attributed to determinate persons through 
legal norms, positive or natural, that provide the ratio – the underlying or 
foundational normative idea – of the ius in question, thereby establishing 
those persons as the holders of aforementioned thing. The law thus situates 
the thing within the realm of the person’s ontological (natural) or conven-
tion-based (positive) possession by a normative connection which renders 
the thing something that is the person’s suum, his own thing 101. In order to 
be constituted as right, a thing must be attributed to a determinate holder. 
Finnis seems to follow, in his own texts, the general lines of this reading of 
Aquinas 102.
But how does the duty to give to each their right (what is due to them), 
i.e. the duty of justice, arise? Finnis would say that this duty is generated, in 
the case of natural title of rights, «by reference to the principles of practical 
reason» 103, in the case of positive title of rights, in the form of the legal and, 
presumptive but defeasible, moral obligations to obey the law according to both 
its «lives» 104. Let’s concentrate, for the sake of the argument, on the case of an 
absolute human right such as life. In a first moment, according to Finnis, this 
right is constituted as an absolute moral claim-right erga omnes through the clus-
ter of moral principles and the relevant principles and requirements of practical 
reasonableness which pick out this «thing» (res) as a human good and specify 
the moral duties in its regard; all this is reducible to a version of the following 
precept: do not act in any way that damages or destroys the basic human good of life 105. 
100 S.Th., II-II, q. 58, a. 1.
101 Vid., S.Th., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2; II-II, q. 57, a. 2.
102 Finnis, J., Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, op. cit., pp. 134-135; Finnis, J., «Practical 
Reason’s Foundations», Reason in Action..., op. cit., p. 21.
103 Finnis, J., «Practical Reason’s Foundations», op. cit., p. 21. «To say that someone has a right is 
to make a claim about what practical reasonableness requires of somebody (or everybody) else»; 
idem, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, op. cit., pp. 134-135.
104 Vid., Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 297-350.
105 Ibid., pp. 225-226; idem, «‘Natural Law’», op. cit., pp. 209-211; idem, «Legal Reasoning as Prac-
tical Reason», op. cit., pp. 216, 226-227; idem, «A Grand Tour of Legal Theory», op. cit., pp. 117, 
120-122; idem, «Reflections and Responses», op. cit., p. 476.
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In a second moment, this same absolute moral right becomes juridical through 
the causally artifactual operation of positing a law which specifies 106, by way of 
reasonable and technical conclusions, the relevant precepts of practical reasona-
bleness, thereby constituting an aspect of law’s third-level goodness.
Finnis’s claim is very similar to the argument on the obligatoriness of 
right forwarded by one of the commentators of Aquinas’s doctrine on right 
and justice, Javier Hervada. In Hervada’s view 107, after the moment of attribu-
tion of a thing (res) to its holder designated by the relevant title, the obligato-
riness of right (ius) arises from the very «exposure» of the thing to the sphere 
of interference of others who might wrongfully act as if the thing is «theirs», 
thereby violating the order established by the legal title, natural or positive. 
Given the fact that the thing – the suum, e.g. human life – is susceptible to the 
interference of others who are not the designated subjects of its attribution, 
all these potential subjects of interference have the obligation to give to each 
titleholder what is his suum 108.
Now, this obligation is, in a first moment that still takes place in the moral 
sphere, established by the precepts and requirements of practical reasonable-
ness and morality at the level of the underlying legal ratio of the obligation. 
Aquinas, Finnis, and Hervada all seem to converge on this point: law is the 
underlying normative framework of right, «aliqualis ratio iuris» 109, «a founda-
tion of or informing idea behind right(s)» 110, «rule of right, that is, reasonable 
rule of that which is just» 111.
But, as Aquinas says, law is not the same thing as right («lex non est ipsum 
ius») 112. In his view, juridicity, or the quality of being juridical, is not the result 
of practical reasonableness or the virtue of prudentia, but the result of being 
106 Vid., Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 218-221, 281-284.
107 For Hervada’s reading of the Aquinas’s account of the «right-justice» cluster of arguments, see 
heRVaDa, J., Critical Introduction to Natural Right, Trans. M. Emmons, Wilson & Lafleur Ltée 
(eds.), Montréal, 2020, pp. 7-30. Vid., also, idem, Lecciones propedéuticas de filosofía del derecho, 
EUNSA, Pamplona, 2008, pp. 198-209; idem, What is Law? The Modern Response of Juridical 
Realism, Trans. W. L. Daniel, Wilson & Lafleur Ltée (eds.), Montréal, 2009, pp. 49-51. 
108 Again, this sounds very similar to Finnis’s line of reasoning regarding «the steady determination 
to respect human good in one’s own existence and the equivalent humanity or human rights of 
others, when that human good and those human rights fall directly into one’s care and disposal». 
See Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 226.
109 S.Th., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2.
110 Finnis, J., «Practical Reason’s Foundations», op. cit., p. 21.
111 heRVaDa, J., Lecciones propedéuticas de filosofía del derecho, op. cit., p. 315.
112 S.Th., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2.
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the object of justice. This is because justice is precisely the dispositional and 
operative principle of maintaining the (in Finnis’s words, practically reasonable) 
order established by the legal norms, natural or positive 113. Said differently, 
justice picks up where practical reasonableness and prudentia left off; while 
these latter establish the order of the attribution of things (res) to determinate 
persons thereby picking out the practically reasonable and moral obligation 
to respect that order, justice is the dispositional principle of respecting the 
difference, as Aquinas says, between suum and non suum in one’s operations, 
i.e. the limits of «mine» as opposed to «yours» 114.
The viewpoint of justice and ius as its object is not only and exclusively 
about rights, as may be concluded from the English translation of ius as right; 
things are, indeed, constituted as what we call rights, but justice and ius is about 
what constitutes juridicity itself, it is the viewpoint of the juridical domain which 
regards both rights and law. The viewpoint of the juridical is the viewpoint of 
what is operatively owed as a suum precisely as distinct from non suum, and 
the character of the obligation or duty switches from moral to juridical when 
we shift the perspective from practical reasonableness and prudentia to justice. 
Thus, basic human goods, such as life, are constituted as ius in their aspects of 
other-directedness, outwardness, and aptness to be attributed and owed as a 
suum, only in the perspective of the virtue of justice which functions as the prin-
ciple of «giving» them, according to their ratio or measure, to their holders.
Now, Aquinas is very clear in his argument that it is precisely the sphere 
of justice and juridicity that «regards a certain special aspect of the good», 
namely, «the good as due in respect of law» 115. There is a discrete level of 
goodness, indeed an aspect of the human good, in the actualization of the opera-
tive principle of maintaining that which is owed in respect of the law, natural 
or positive. The term of the operative principle of justice, namely, the thing 
(res) constituted as ius, shares in this discrete level of goodness, thereby itself 
becoming a good, juridical good: «justice is praiseworthy in respect of the vir-
tuous person being well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat 
the good of another person» 116.
113 S.Th., I-II, q. 61, a. 2-4; I-II, q. 96, a. 3; II-II, q. 79, a. 1.
114 S.Th., I-II, q. 66, a. 4, ad 1.
115 S.Th., II-II, q. 79, a. 1. Emphasis added.
116 S.Th., II-II, q. 58, a. 12. For the specific good of justice that consists in the actualization of the 
order of reason in operations, within the above-described range of the properties of the thing 
to-be-constitutes-as-right, see S.Th., I-II, q. 61, a. 2-4; I-II, q. 60, a. 2-3.
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In sum, the basic human good, such as life, becomes a basic or natural ju-
ridical good 117 in the sphere of justice, where it is «being given» – by operatively 
distinguishing between suum and non suum, «mine» as opposed to «yours» 
– to its title-holder according to the underlying ratio expressed in the legal 
norm, natural or positive. I am not saying that Finnis completely disregards 
the importance of the arguments related to the sphere of justice and ius as its 
object – that simply would not be true 118. I do, however, argue that he tends to 
settle the complex issues of the genesis of the juridical domain and juridical obli-
gation predominantly at the level of practical reasonableness and the virtue of 
prudentia, to the detriment of perceiving the benefits in assigning some of the 
arguments regarding justice and ius in the perspective of juridical goodness a 
more prominent role in those issues 119.
I wish to highlight again that nothing in this argument on the juridical 
good is meant to catalyze a purely historical analysis of the semantics of ius, 
nor to propose putting the clock back with regard to conceptual watersheds 
of rights-talk. I am advocating the usefulness of expanding the range of law’s 
goodness in order to include a reference to the discrete level of the juridical 
good while reading Aquinas, following Finnis’s advice, «as a participant in 
today’s debates» 120. I argue that this «effort is rewarding» 121 in the following 
117 Again, only in its outward and other-directed aspects which are otherwise apt for attribution as 
due according to either the natural or the positive legal norm.
118 For Finnis’s treatment of the role of justice, either with regard to rights, or regarding justice as 
the element of the public good, vid., Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., pp. 205-
210, 423-424; idem, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, op. cit., pp. 132-133, 137-138, 
226-234; idem, «Aquinas on Ius and Hart on Rights», op. cit., pp. 407-410; idem, «Grounding 
Human Rights in Natural Law», op. cit., pp. 200, 208-209, 214-215; idem, «On Moyn’s Christian 
Human Rights (2015)», op. cit., pp. 14-15.
119 In the Postscript to NLNR Finnis seems to perceive these same problems to a certain degree, 
though not to the extent to which I develop them here: «The opportunity is missed to reflect a 
little, somewhere in the chapter [VII], on the fact that the classic definition picks out a virtue – [...] 
a steady and lasting willingness to give to each the right(s) that belong(s) to each [‘his or her right’]. 
As noted above, the book could with advantage have given more attention to virtue as stability of 
disposition, shaped up by choices as lasting, i.e. as an immanent, intransitive effect of choosing, the 
virtuous and virtue-making choices being those guidemed accurately by practical reasonableness. 
Neither this chapter nor Chapter VIII on rights reports that Aquinas adopts that same definition 
as his own definition of justice». Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., p. 460.
120 According to Finnis, «the best way to understand Aquinas, even historically, is to read him as a 
participant in today’s debates [and] though this involves both some risk and some contextualiz-
ing, the effort is rewarding, and can be quite faithful to what he meant». Finnis, J., «Aquinas 
and Natural Law Jurisprudence», op. cit., p. 17.
121 Ibid., p. 17.
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aspects: besides highlighting Aquinas’s own position on the overlap between 
juridicity and goodness, natural rights (or natural juridical goods) are finally 
considered not only as moral, but as properly juridical; they are rooted at the 
same time in reality («in re», in the things as they are in themselves) and under-
stood as an aspect – juridical aspect – of the human good that is inherently 
other-directed (rights as the goods of another person).
With regard to rights, natural or positive, the Thomistic argument on 
their juridical goodness opens up a possibility for their conceptualization not 
only as self-centric superstructures (moral or artifactual) that are essentially 
distinct from things as they are in themselves, and whose juridicity is wholly 
dependent on positive law; they are not positive law subjectivized or, otherwise, 
natural-law moral rights. The benefits and pay-offs of conceptualizing rights 
as juridical goods seems to me to be fully intelligible, and perhaps even ap-
pealing, to most corners of contemporary jurisprudence and legal philosophy, 
not necessarily only those that are aligned with other aspects of the Thomistic 
conception of law, right and justice.
But, what does all this, in the ultimate analysis, have to do with laws as 
good reasons for action? Well, to begin with, juridical goods constitute an 
additional juridical level of reasons for action, be they connected to natural or 
positive law.
Since natural juridical goods are conceptually prior to positive law, and 
because they do not need positing in order to be fully juridical, these goods 
constitute good juridical reasons for action. Thus, basic human goods do not 
represent the only reasonable or moral basis for the activities of legislators, 
but, since they are constituted as natural juridical goods, they offer a juridical 
basis that must be taken into consideration for the acts of law’s positing. In ad-
dition, the constitution of basic human goods as juridical goods structures the 
very basic human goods not only as «things» (res) that are reasonably or mor-
ally owed to their subjects, but as «things» that constitute genuine juridical 
obligation based on the very fact of their other-directed and outward attribu-
tion and obligatoriness in justice, even before being specified by positive law. 
Juridical goodness thus constitutes an essential aspect of the very structure of 
basic human goods.
Next, positive law is also provided with an additional layer of good ju-
ridical reasons for action, to the extent that there is not only a practically 
reasonable or moral obligation to obey the law, but also an obligation in strict 
justice to attain the juridical good by maintaining the order established by 
positive law.
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In addition, unjust laws would be «no laws at all» not only from the prac-
tically reasonable viewpoint, as this is successfully explained by Finnis, but also 
because, in the case of natural juridical goods, there are prior juridical reasons 
for action that are thereby violated, constituting a discrete level of injustice con-
sisting in the fact that each person (or the community of persons) has not been 
given his own right. I argue that this additional discrete level of law’s justice corre-
sponds to Aquinas’s tripartition of law’s accordance with the human good: they 
are either «just» laws («iustae sunt») – hence, they are in accordance with what I 
here refer to as juridical good – or morally «binding in conscience» («obligant in 
foro conscientiae») or constitute «legal laws» («sunt leges legales») 122.
The same line of argument points to the existence of an additional neces-
sary conceptual connection between morality and juridicity, and this connec-
tion is grounded in the emphasis on the ontological continuity of the things 
(res) as they are in themselves between pre-juridical and juridical (and also legal, 
in the case of positive juridical goods) domains. For example, a natural jurid-
ical good, such as human life, has the same ontological identity as the basic 
human good of life in the moral sphere, while at the same time constituting a 
set of good juridical reason for action regarding the law’s practical viewpoint 
relevant for the technical-artifactual specification of the corresponding norms 
of positive law regarding the same good of life. In this perspective, it becomes 
even clearer that positive law’s artifactuality does not operate in full disconti-
nuity with regards to structurally prior juridical goods, and therefore does not, 
so to speak, create juridicity ex nihilo.
With these arguments in mind, I am certain that John Finnis’s account 
of the levels of law’s goodness, perhaps together with the remarks on an ad-
ditional level of its goodness revisited in this section, will continue to be an 
inspiration to many future generations of legal philosophers, in the same way 
(or in some new ways) that the intellectual force of his arguments has had a 
formative influence on many legal theorists and lawyers, including myself. 
And, for this, my deepest gratitude, professor Finnis.
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